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Abstract—Thanks to the advance of technology, all
kinds of applications are becoming more complete and
capable of performing complex tasks that save much
of our time. But to perform these tasks, applications
require that some personal information are shared, for
example credit card, bank accounts, email addresses, etc.
All these data must be transferred securely between the
final user and the institution application. Nonetheless,
several applications might contain residual flaws that may
be explored by criminals in order to steal users data.
Hence, to help information security professionals and
developers to perform penetration tests (pentests) on web
applications, this paper presents Robin: A Web Security
Tool. The tool is also applied to a real case study in which a
very dangerous vulnerability was found. This vulnerability
is also described in this paper.
Keywords: penetration test, pentest, web security tool,
vulnerabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, software applications have im-
proved the way how companies provide services to
their customers. To provide these facilities, software
systems are expanding and becoming more com-
plex, and this expansion has the direct consequence
of increasing the company Attack Surface, i.e., the
organizations infrastructure (applications, endpoints,
cloud servers, etc.) vs possible attack vectors that each
one of these infrastructure subsystems may su er [1].
Furthermore, hacking practice is also expanding
and becoming more popular [2] [3]. The more com-
plex and huge a system is, the more are the chances
of finding some vulnerability a developer may have
left in the system [4]. Systems are still built by hu-
mans, there will certainly have residual faults1, and
these faults are expensive and can also cause several
problems [6]. The increase of more cyber attacks and
specific tools focused on exploring breaches [7] - like
botnets, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and even
results of crimes (e.g., stolen credit card numbers,
compromised hosts) - emphasizes the necessity of
new and more complete tools to help developers to
find known vulnerabilities during the development
process.
In this context, web-based applications are one of
the most a ected groups, since this kind of applica-
tions are the front door of the companies systems,
1We use fault, error, failure as defined in "Basic concepts and
taxonomy of dependable and secure computing" [5]
and has a direct relation with the client. OWASP
Top 10 [8] project, for example, enumerates the 10
most common security breaches that most of the web
applications have and their respective impact on the
system. Each of these vulnerabilities has its security
issues and may lead to serious problems.
To face that problem, in the past, companies would
invest most of their resources on manual code-review
to remove residual software faults. This strategy has
become impracticable on complex systems and is
also error-prone since they are executed by humans.
Therefore, the security tools market is getting bigger
with the increase of systems complexity and also
vulnerabilities discoveries. Companies have become
aware that investing in software to detect possible
breaches on their systems is less expensive than suf-
fering the consequences of getting their systems -
or even worse, their data - exposed. But the most
popular and complete tools available on the market
are proprietary - it means that their source code
belongs to a company and cannot be seen, edited and
shared by the rest of the community - and generally
have expensive licenses.
To help developer and security engineers on find-
ing residual faults left on a web system we intro-
duce Robin: a new open-source web security tool.
Open-source software brings a lot of benefits, includ-
ing cost-e ectiveness, fast development, security, and
completely free usage. Besides that, open-source code
stimulates developers to use and contribute with it,
promoting the culture of performing vulnerabilities
research and making the available software more se-
cure to everyone.
This paper sections are structured as follows. Sec-
tion II provides information about the concepts of
penetration tests, attack vectors, ethical hacking, and
open-source tools. Section III presents some tools
and techniques on the context of web application
vulnerabilities and the most used and popular tools
available on the market. In Section IV we propose
our web security tool, presenting its features, develop-
ment environment and execution Roadmap. Finally,
Sections VII and VIII present future development and
some conclusions.
Fig. 1: Enterprise attack surface [1]
II. BACKGROUND
This section introduces topics that are fundamental
to present and discuss the proposal in Section IV.
First, Section II-A presents the Attack Vectors that
a ect most companies. After that, in Section II-B,
describes Ethical Hacking - what it is, why it is impor-
tant and why it is the central point of our proposal.
Finally, Section II-C introduces the Open Source topic,
presenting some benefits and drawbacks of using and
creating open-source projects.
A. Attack Surface & Attack Vectors
As mentioned in Section I, the more a company
expands its applications and services, the more At-
tack Vectors may appear due to the company Attack
Surface increase. A company Attack Surface is made
up of a relation between its devices and applications
connected to the network [1] - summarized as things
can go wrong from a cybersecurity standpoint - and
the Attack Vectors, i.e, ways in which these things will
go wrong. This relation is illustrated in Figure 1.
B. Penetration Testing
A natural response to the growing cybercrimes is
Penetration Testing (pentesting) [9] practice. This kind
of job focus on performing cyberattacks to detect
existing vulnerabilities on a computer-based system.
It can be practiced by either well-intended hackers
or not. Those that practice pentesting to seek to
report these vulnerabilities to the software owners
so they can fix it are known as Ethical Hackers [10].
These well-intentioned hackers focus their e orts on
using di erent attack vectors to find vulnerabilities
on common software use and report these failures to
the software owners so they can fix them before the
breach is used to harm the platform users in exchange
for bounties. On the companies side, some are adher-
ing to bug bounty programs - such as HackerOne2 -
or even creating their own - as Facebook Bug Bounty3,
Apple Security Bounty4 and others. These programs
are summarized on ethical hackers reporting existing
vulnerabilities on companies’ software and getting
paid by their activity.
This new market is a reflection of people using their
knowledge to make common software safer. Other
amazing initiatives are organizations like OWASP [11],
which creates projects like OWASP Top Ten Project [8]
to present the most common vulnerabilities mistakes,
including examples about how to reproduce, explore
2https://hackerone.com/
3https://www.facebook.com/whitehat
4https://developer.apple.com/security-bounty/
and protect against these threats. A knowledge that
was used mostly for evilness is now being used to
make the web safer, and it must be encouraged.
To perform this research, it is very common to
use tools and techniques to automate the process
of finding and testing possible vulnerabilities. The
size of modern systems makes manual analysis and
code-review impracticable. Isolated components may
become vulnerable when used together, and mapping
all possible vulnerable scenarios is unworkable. This
impracticability creates a whole new market niche of
tools and techniques to improve this field.
C. Open Source Software
Open Source Software (OSS) is not a new concept.
It dates back in the 1950s [12], when hardware and
software were delivered together - without a separate
fee - and started gaining a lot of relevance with the
launch of GNU Project by Richard Stallman in 1983,
who also founded the Free Software Foundation a
few years later. In 1989, the first version of the GNU
General Public License was launched, which was used
later by popular OSS like Linux Kernel.
After years of OSS development, code-sharing, and
community engagement, we can see today the ben-
efits - and also the drawbacks - that OSS has. Lor-
raine et al. [13] examined the benefits and draw-
backs of OSS usage in 13 companies operating in
the secondary software sector in Europe. According
to the study, some of the technical benefits of using
OSS are Reliability, Security, Quality, Performance and
Flexibility. In contrast to the benefits, the technical
drawbacks of using OSS were Compatibility Issues,
Lack of Expertise, Poor documentation, Proliferation of
Interfaces, Less Functionality and Lack of Roadmaps.
According to the article, the OSS usage has clear ben-
efits and drawbacks. But all drawbacks that were ex-
perienced by the companies are characteristics from
the OSS that were used by them, and may not be
true in other examples of OSS. The Linux Kernel is
an example of an open-source project that exposes
an entire Operational System with a well-documented
code-base.
AlMarzouq et al. presents [14] the concepts, benefits
and challenges of using OSS. On the aspect of the
Software-Centered Approach, i.e., the usage of the
open-source software, they present similar benefits as
discussed above: Reliability, Security and Low Cost. To
complement the benefits, they enumerate the chal-
lenges that OSS face:
• OSS is not deadline-driven, which may be a prob-
lem if the user depends on future events;
• OSS is not well established in some areas as
proprietary software is;
• OSS involves in a high entry barrier for non-
technical users, since the first cases of success
OSS, the users and developers were the same;
• OSS support experience may vary since the OSS
maintainers are not obligated to provide support
to the users;
III. RELATEDWORK
The creation of tools to analyze web vulnerabilities
is not a new trend. Some works discuss and present
di erent tools and techniques to analyze di erent
scenarios. Most of the tools are focused on finding
possible attack vectors on web applications, but there
are other interesting aspects that focus on developing
tools to prevents attacks to the user. Some of the
papers that discuss these tools and techniques are
presented in Related Papers, while the most popular
tools available on the market are discussed in Related
Tools.
A. Related Papers
Esteban et al. [15] present a benchmark of the most
common web vulnerability scanners. They argue that
these application benchmarks are made periodically,
but these analyses are biased by the author’s method-
ology. On this benchmark, they answer questions such
as: The tool truly test and evaluate every vulnerability
that it ensures do?, and even The tool delivers a real
report of all the vulnerabilities tested and exploited?.
Dalalana and Zorzo [9] provide an overview of pen-
etration test scenarios, models, methodologies and
tools. They evaluated 1,154 papers with di erent pen-
test models and tools, classifying them according to
their category and phase on the pentest execution.
Their study goes beyond web-application based tools
and approach all categories of cybersecurity tools.
Jovanic et al. [16] discuss the development of a
open-source prototype tool to detect Cross Site Script-
ing (XSS) vulnerabilities in PHP scripts. Their results
during the usage of the prototype reported 15 un-
known vulnerabilities in three Web applications and
reconstruction of 36 known vulnerabilities in three
other Web applications, with a false positive of 50%.
Prateek et al. [17] propose dynamic analysis tech-
niques to discover Client Side Vulnerabilities (CSV).
After that, they create a prototype tool named FLEX,
which has discovered 11 real-world vulnerabilities.
Sebastian et al. [18] present a full automated system
capable of detecting DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities
in large scale. They applied the system on Alexa top
5000, and the system was able to identify 6,167 vul-
nerabilities across 418 unique domains, showing that
almost 10% of the analyzed websites had some kind of
DOM-based Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.
It is interesting how they found a huge amount of
vulnerable websites searching only for a specific kind
of XSS. The number of vulnerabilities could have been
even bigger if they had searched for all kinds of web
vulnerabilities.
Philipp et al. [19] present a study based on XSS
vulnerabilities. They developed a dynamic approach
to track the user sensitive data and detect if these
data are sent to third party applications. Doing so,
they can warn the user about the track of this sensitive
information and interrupt the connection if necessary.
They also performed some tests in real-word applica-
tions and controlled vulnerable scenarios and the tool
successfully detected the XSS attacks. A similar tool
is presented by Ismail et al. [20]. They analyze the
user tra c and detect possible XSS vulnerabilities by
manipulating these requests.
Tadeusz et al. [21] present another way of prevent-
ing XSS attacks by manipulating the user string input.
They show that most of the injection attacks occur
because the user input is manipulated. They perform
a context-sensitive string evaluation to prevent un-
desired modifications on the user input, but it has a
drawback of reasonable run-time overhead.
B. Related Tools
Alongside the tools described by the papers in
the previous section, we have popular tools that are
widely used by most of infosec (Information Security)
professionals while searching for vulnerabilities. We
discuss some of these tools and their main features
in the next sections.
1) Charles: Charles5 is a Web Proxy Debug tool. It
provides support to create a proxy through the user
machine to inspect HTTP and HTTPS tra c. Charles
is not a penetration tool on its own since it does not
provide explicit tools and features to perform specific
attack scenarios on a penetration test. But it provides
an interesting set of functionalities that can help an
early phase of detection, such as the content of the
packets - even HTTPS packets - and tools to intercept
and change requests and responses.
2) Burp Suite: Burp Suite6 is a Cybersecurity Soft-
ware application with emphasis on providing func-
tionalities to explore pentest scenarios. It has com-
plete and complex tools to perform active scan -
search actively on a specific domain for common
vulnerabilities -, passive scan, tools to manipulate
requests, test for specific attack scenarios and more.
This tool drawback is its price, costing $4007 the
individual license and $4000 the enterprise license.
3) Acunetix: Acunetix8 is likely the most popu-
lar web vulnerability scanner available on the mar-
ket. This tool provides an automated scanner that
searches for over 6,500 vulnerabilities on software
applications with a false positive ration near to 0%.
It has a huge set of tools and features that allows
performing very custom scan flows to detect the
5https://www.charlesproxy.com/
6https://portswigger.net/burp
7Price in June 2020.
8https://www.acunetix.com/
widest range of vulnerabilities on complex systems.
Due to its popularity and adoption by the most known
and respected software companies, Acunetix has a
license price starting at $4,495 for the Standard plan9
(maximum 5 websites scans).
4) Arachini: Arachini10 has the same purpose as
Acunetix - scan websites looking for vulnerabilities.
But Arachini is an open-source project, and it is com-
pletely free to use. Unfortunately, its development life
cycle has o cially stopped in January 2020, when the
company that mainly maintains the software focus its
e orts on investments to hire more developers.
5) OWASP Zap: As a reflection of the Top 10 project,
the OWASP organization developed OWASP ZAP 11.
They provide tools for developers who want to debug
their applications and pentesters that are seeking for
vulnerabilities on web applications. As the Arachini
project, ZAP is an open-source tool and is maintained
by the open-source community, with the support of
some tech companies, such as the previously men-
tioned HackerOne. Although OWASP ZAP is an open-
source tool that acts in the same field as Robin is
proposed on. However, we aim to propose a more
user friendly tool with a more compact user interface.
Robin can also become much more powerful than
OWASP ZAP when we consider the 5 Robin modules
working together, as described in Section IV.
IV. PROPOSAL
Given the benefits that Penetration Testing tools
bring to Ethical Hackers on automating tasks of find-
ing vulnerabilities on web application systems and
the benefits OSS development discussed in Section II,
we propose the development of an open-source web
penetration tool. We discuss an idealized application -
with the most relevant features and techniques used
during a penetration test - and an MVP (Minimum
Viable Product) implementation, which will be the
target of this work.
A. Idealized Application
We visualize the final application as a super-set
of the most used and relevant tools during a web
application penetration test. Figure 2 illustrates these
application modules.
• Proxy: A proxy module capable of listing, in-
tercepting and modifying HTTP and HTTPS re-
quests. This is the fundamental module of the
application, and it will be used by all the func-
tionalities that follow.
• Scanner: A module that can actively scan a web-
site looking for patterns that are explored by most
common vulnerabilities. The module is capable
9Price in June 2020.
10https://www.arachni-scanner.com/
11https://owasp.org/www-project-zap/
Fig. 2: Application modules
of exposing these patterns and explain a possible
attack scenario using the found pattern.
• Repeater: A module capable of performing brute-
force attacks, following some pre-set configura-
tions and patterns.
• Coder: A module capable of encoding and de-
coding contents using common hashing patterns:
MD5, AES, SHA256, Base 64, etc. It also could
break weak old hash techniques, like reused One
Time Pad, MD5, etc.
• Wiki: A module with the explanation of the most
common vulnerabilities, how they work, how to
explore them and how to protect an application
against them, similar to OWASP Top 10 Project.
B. MVP Functionality
In this work, we propose the implementation of
an MVP from the idealized application. We will work
on the Proxy module, highlighted in blue in Figure
2. This implementation consists on the creation of
an application that lists, intercepts and edits HTTP
and HTTPS requests. To achieve the functionality, it
is necessary to implement the following features:
• Create a local proxy server;
• Redirects all the user network tra c through this
proxy;
• Filter tra c to only handle HTTP and HTTPS
requests;
• Create the application certificate - and make the
user trust it - to be able to perform a man in
the middle session and be able to visualize the
decrypted HTTPS packets content;
• Summarize, format and list these requests;
• Provide a way to intercept and edit the requests
before they leave the user machine;
To implement the Proxy module, we use Electron12
- a framework used to build cross-platform applica-
tions - and React JS13 - a framework to build user
interfaces using Javascript and CSS. As mentioned on
the previous sections, the application is completely
free and open-source and is available at Github 14.
V. DEVELOPMENT
This section presents the development of Robin and
its first main module: Proxy. As mentioned in Section
IV, the application is built using Electron and React
frameworks. Electron provides a simple way to launch
web-based apps as a native OS app. In the same way,
React provides a tool to build user interfaces using
Javascript. Figure 3 shows a graphical representation
of the application core architecture.
Fig. 3: Application Core Structure
Electron loads two modules: Main and Renderer.
The Main module is the one responsible for per-
forming OS-level tasks, such as intercepting network
packages, resolving DNS, turning on machine proxy
settings, etc. The Renderer module is responsible for
presenting the graphical interface and respond to user
interactions. The communication between both mod-
ules happens through the Electron IPC (Interprocess
Communication) module, which provides a way of
making synchronous and asynchronous communica-
tion using messages.
As mentioned in Section IV, the main goal of this
work is to implement the Proxy module. To create this
environment where we can intercept requests before
they leave the user machine and the responses before
they are consumed by the client, we createdWeb Snif-
fer15: a framework capable of intercepting requests
and responses built using Node16. The framework
architecture is illustrated in Figure 4 and described
next:
• The bridge module is responsible for routing the
requests to the appropriate servers. If it is an
12https://www.electronjs.org/
13https://reactjs.org/
14https://github.com/
15https://github.com/olmps/web-sni er
16https://nodejs.org/
HTTP request, it is redirected to HTTP Server, if it
is an HTTPS request, it is redirected to the HTTPS
server.
Fig. 4: Proxy Framework Architecture
• Both HTTP and HTTPS servers are almost identi-
cal. The only di erence is the certificate handling
that is required by HTTPS, since the requests are
encrypted. Aside from this certificate manage-
ment, the remaining request handling is identical
and it is performed by the Server abstraction,
which is inherited by both servers. To be able to
decipher HTTPS requests, Robin’s proxy module
acts as a Man In the Middle proxy. The user must
trust Robin’s certificates to read HTTPS requests.
These HTTPS requests are exchanged between
the proxy module and the target server using the
server certificates and then they are exchanged
with the user using Robin’s certificates. This way
it is possible to easily decipher the package en-
cryption and read/change its content.
• All requests are sent and received by their final
destination through the Router module. This is
the connection between the framework and the
internet.
This framework is fundamental to Robin’s develop-
ment since its purpose is based on network tra c
sni ng and manipulation. The Proxy framework is
located at the Main module since it requires com-
munication on the OS-level. Once the packages are
intercepted they are sent to the Renderer module,
where they can be presented and manipulated by the
user.
VI. ACTUAL CASE STUDY
On this section, we apply the tool in a real case
scenario. The target website is from a famous news
company in Brazil17. In this section, we demonstrate
how to use Robin to gain full access to random cus-
tomers accounts, extract sensitive information such
as bank accounts, credit card, email, addresses, and
much more. At the end, we discuss future attack
scenarios using other modules presented in Section
IV. The pentest process is divided into two stages:
• Analyzes - At this stage Robin is used to analyze
the target network requests, looking for possible
breaches on the data that is being exchanged.
At this point we do not modify the information,
we just analyze and point out hypothesis about
possible exploit scenarios based on the data being
exchanged.
• Execution - On this stage, we try the hypotheses
created on the previous stage. Then the data
being exchanged are modified to see how the
target application responds to that.
It is important to emphasize that all sensitive in-
formation, such as the target website and the hacked
user was anonymized and protected. The goal of
this use case is to demonstrate the tool usage on
a real-world scenario, and not to expose sensitive
information.
A. Analyzes
The target news company has a news website where
customers can purchase plans to read their exclusive
newspapers and posts. At this stage, their login system
was analyzed. The requests and data exchanged, when
the user login on their platform, is recorded by Robin
so we can create some hypothesis about any possible
breach on their system. Figure 5 shows some data
exchanged when the login credentials are sent to their
server.
At this point, we have no evidence of a flaw in the
login system. The response returns some verification
17The security engineers of the company have already been
notified on these vulnerabilities.
Fig. 5: Login Request
tokens, the customer name, email and other flags.
We also point out that their system is using Google
Authentication API to perform the customers authen-
tication. This is important because our chances of
finding some exploit naturally decrease since they are
using a solid and well-known authentication API.
Also, identifiers and tokens are always interesting
to take a closer look, since this kind of information
is commonly used to perform Insecure Direct Object
References (IDOR) 18 exploits.
Once the login information is exchanged, the appli-
cation starts firing requests to fetch user information
and other application data. Figure 6 shows these re-
quests content. Taking a closer look at these requests
content, we can notice some coincidence with the
previously analyzed request. Both of them use a par-
ticular identifier, prefixed with from-wrs, followed by a
number. Coincidentally, this is the same identifier that
was returned by the authentication request previously
made.
Fig. 6: User Info Request
18https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/what-are-
insecure-direct-object-references/
This raises some unanswered and really interesting
questions:
• Why the requests that fetch the user information
are not using Google’s API tokens returned from
the previous request?
• We know that session tokens must be com-
pletely random to guarantee the session to be
safe from any possible brute-force attacks, and
the id 3178104 does not seem to be random at
all. Moreover, this id looks like an incremental
identifier, which is even worst.
The most obvious hypothesis - that is later proven
right - is that this id returned from Google’s API is the
user identifier on the magazine server. Although their
authentication system uses Google’s Auth API, they
are not well integrated, so the website is using this
user identifier as the “authentication” token to fetch
the information instead of the tokens returned from
Google.
This is a clear situation of IDOR (Insecure Direct
Object Reference) exploit, where the exchanged ob-
jects can be manipulated to gain improper access. The
next stage tries this knowledge to exploit this possible
vulnerability.
B. Execution
The exploit scenario is clear. Unless something was
wrongly analysed in the previous stage, this is an
clear situation of an IDOR exploit, and we can change
that identifier to get improper access to the system.
Fig. 7: Response Manipulation
Robin provides features to manipulate the requests
before they leave the machine and the responses
before they are consumed by the client, and we will
use these features to manipulate the identifier. Figure
7 shows the response manipulation from Google’s
Authentication API. If the hypothesis is correct, this
id is an incremental identifier and it will be used
by the system to indicate which user is asking for
information. Just increasing this identifier by 1 may
return the information from a completely random
user from the platform.
Tapping the Send button from Robin will make the
response arrive modified to the client. This way our
browser will consume the identifier 3178105 instead
3178104. Once the response is consumed, the requests
that fetch the user information are sent and, as shown
by Figure 8, the requests that fetch the user infor-
mation are being made using the recently modified
identifier 3178105. It indicates that the application
accepted our modified response and that we now are
logged in as user 3178105. Besides that, the response
from the request returns data from a customer called
Marlene, which is not the display name of our test
account.
This proves the IDOR exploit on the company web-
site. Just by modifying a simple identifier, we could get
full access from a random user account. Navigating
a little bit through their settings page, we could ex-
tract information like full name, email address, phone
number, bank account, customer house address,
the days that the physical newspaper is delivered to
the customer house, customer credit card and much
more sensitive information. Such a small develop-
ment issue allowed us to hack this customer account
using Robin to manipulate the requests and response
information.
This entire attack scenario was described in a for-
mal document sent to the news company so they can
fix it as soon as possible. IDOR exploits are classified
as Injection attacks and are #1 Applications Security
Risk according to OWASP Top 10 project [8].
This case study is just an example on how powerful
Robin can be just by having its core proxy module. We
have demonstrated just one possible attack scenario,
but Robin is also able to perform a lot of di erent vul-
nerabilities testing, such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS),
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), Unvalidated Redi-
rects and Forwards and so on. The possibility of being
able to read and change HTTP and HTTPS requests
gives a lot of possible di erent attack scenarios, and
Robin is ready to handle all of them.
VII. FUTUREDEVELOPMENT
With the features provided by the current Robin
version, we could analyze and execute a simple attack
scenario. We discovered an IDOR exploit on the target
website and could get unauthorized access to a ran-
dom customer account, and there, we could extract
a lot of sensitive information. By itself this breach
on the authentication flow is critical, but we can go
beyond that.
As described in Section IV and illustrated by Figure
2, this demonstrates the capability that only the Proxy
Fig. 8: User Information Response
module allowed us to achieve. But with the infor-
mation that we extracted with this attack, combined
with the Repeater module described in the same
section, we could create an attack scenario where we
performed multiple requests incrementing the user
identifier on authentication requests to log in on
di erent accounts and extract these accounts data.
Combining both modules with the discovered exploit
it could be possible to extract the information from
all platform users, including personal and payment
data. And this attack scenario could be possible with-
out writing a single line of code. Robin can be able to
perform all these tasks by itself.
The development of the Proxy module is just the be-
ginning. Combining the 5 presented modules, Robin
can become a very powerful tool able to perform com-
plex attack scenarios quickly and precisely. Robin is
an open-source project, and its current development
stage can be found on its Github page 19
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduces Robin: a powerful open-
source tool that helps information security profes-
sionals and developers to find possible vulnerabilities
on web applications. The application development
environment and architecture were discussed and a
real-world exploit scenario was demonstrated using
Robin. We aimed at the discussions of the previous
sections to emphasize and to demonstrate the impor-
tance of information security research and knowledge
when developing web applications. Minor security
issues may lead to several consequences.
We also discussed the information security tools
available on the market and their pros and cons.
Robin was created aiming to put together the best
modules available on these tools, remove or fix the
bad ones and to be a completely free and open-source
tool, driven by the information security community.
We hope that with this contribution we can help to
19http://github.com/olmps/robin
attract more developers to the security research world
and make the applications safer to its users.
Some future work could be to add some formal
specification of attacks that could be interpreted by
Robin in order to verify whether a tool provides the
security as it was specified, similar to the one pre-
sented by Peralta et al. [22]
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